Court Balances Right to Travel Under Article 21 with Need for Orderly Progress of Criminal Proceedings and Effective Justice Administration
In a significant judgment dated September 30, 2026, the Delhi High Court dismissed a petition filed by Luv Bhardwaj challenging a condition imposed by the Special Judge, CBI-19, restricting him from filing similar applications for foreign travel within six months except in exceptional and compelling circumstances. The petitioner, accused in a serious economic offence case and currently on bail, had sought to strike down this limitation imposed while granting him permission to travel abroad.
The background of the case involves the petitioner's earlier applications to travel to Istanbul, Turkey, and Paris, France, on tourist visas, which were permitted by the trial court subject to several conditions including submission of affidavits, security deposits, and commitments not to delay the trial. The contentious condition was that the petitioner could not move any similar application for foreign travel within six months unless exceptional and compelling reasons were shown.
The petitioner contended that this condition infringed his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, including the right to travel abroad. He argued that having complied with all prior conditions, he should not be subjected to such a restriction.
The Delhi High Court, presided by Justice Sachin Datta, delivered a detailed analysis balancing the fundamental rights of the accused with the larger interests of justice. The Court reiterated that while the right to travel abroad is a facet of personal liberty under Article 21, it is not absolute, especially when criminal proceedings are pending. The Court referred extensively to the Supreme Court's decision in Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana (2026), emphasizing the need to balance individual liberty with the right to a speedy trial and societal interest in effective criminal justice administration.
The Court noted that the restriction imposed was not an absolute prohibition but a regulatory safeguard designed to prevent routine and incessant applications for foreign travel, which could impede the orderly progress of the trial. It acknowledged that the petitioner's past compliance with court-imposed travel conditions was a relevant factor but did not confer an indefeasible right to frequent foreign travel permissions.
Importantly, the Court clarified that the petitioner retains the liberty to approach the trial court within the six-month period if exceptional and compelling circumstances arise, and such applications will be considered on their merits. The Court found no constitutional infirmity in the trial court's condition and held that it was justified to ensure the petitioner's availability for trial and to prevent abuse of the permission granted.
The petition was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming the judiciary's role in balancing fundamental rights with the imperatives of criminal justice. The Court's judgment underscores that personal liberty rights are subject to reasonable restrictions to serve the interest of justice and societal welfare.
This ruling provides clarity on the extent to which courts can regulate foreign travel of accused persons during the pendency of criminal trials and highlights the judiciary's nuanced approach in safeguarding both individual rights and public interest.
Bottom Line:
Criminal procedure - Permission to travel abroad by accused during pendency of trial - Condition restraining accused from moving similar application for six months except in exceptional and compelling circumstances - Held, such condition is not an absolute prohibition but a limited regulatory safeguard - Right to travel abroad under Article 21 has to be balanced with orderly progress of criminal proceedings, securing presence of accused and effective administration of criminal justice - Past compliance with earlier travel permissions does not create indefeasible right to seek repeated foreign travel as a matter of routine.
Statutory provision(s):
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 528, Constitution of India, 1950 Article 21
Luv Bhardwaj v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (Delhi) : Law Finder Doc Id # 2992757
