Supreme Court Restores Appeals by Pinarayi Vijayan, Says Non-Parties Named in High Court FIR Order Can Challenge It, Court holds Kerala High Court erred in denying leave to appeal to persons against whom FIR and probe were ordered; investigation stayed for 10 days to allow interim relief plea
The Supreme Court on October 21, 2026, ruled that persons against whom a High Court has directed registration of an FIR and investigation, even though they were not parties to the original writ proceedings, have the legal standing to challenge such an order in appeal.
A Bench of Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana passed the order in appeals filed by former Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan and others against a Kerala High Court Division Bench decision that had refused them leave to appeal. The High Court had earlier declined to entertain their challenge to a Single Judge’s order directing registration of FIRs and investigation on the basis of information shared by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
The case arose after the Enforcement Directorate shared information with the State alleging that materials disclosed cognizable offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The State police had constituted a Special Investigation Team for a preliminary enquiry. Dissatisfied with that course, a writ petitioner approached the High Court.
The Single Judge then quashed the State’s decision to hold a preliminary enquiry and directed the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau to immediately register an FIR against the suspected persons named in the ED communication, investigate the matter, and file a final report without delay. The court also directed transfer of the relevant materials and documents for the purpose of investigation.
Challenging this, the appellants argued before the Supreme Court that they had been directly affected by the Single Judge’s findings and directions, despite not being heard in the writ proceedings. They contended that the High Court Division Bench wrongly denied them leave to appeal on the ground that an accused has no right of hearing before registration of an FIR.
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that once information under Section 66(2) of the PMLA disclosed cognizable offences, the State was bound to register an FIR and that no prior hearing to the accused was required at that stage. Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India.
Rejecting that broad objection, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between a routine FIR registration by the State and a case where FIR registration and investigation were triggered by a judicial order containing findings on the material. The Bench noted that the Single Judge had not merely ordered registration of the FIR but had also observed that the ED material disclosed cognizable offences and had further directed commencement of investigation and filing of a final report.
The Court held that if the appellants were not allowed to challenge those findings in appeal, such findings could prejudice them in future proceedings where they might independently challenge the FIR. On that basis, the Bench concluded that they clearly had locus to appeal and that the Division Bench’s refusal to grant leave was erroneous.
The Supreme Court also referred to the changed statutory framework under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. It observed that unlike the earlier Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 175(4) BNSS contemplates, in certain cases involving public servants, a report from a superior officer and consideration of the public servant’s assertions before directing investigation. The Bench clarified that this discussion was not a ruling on the merits of the present controversy, but was intended to highlight the broader participatory framework under the new criminal procedure law.
Importantly, the Court further observed that the Single Judge’s directions went beyond mere FIR registration and extended to investigation and filing of a final report. Such directions, it said, may require consideration of statutory safeguards under special laws, including sanction requirements under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Setting aside the High Court Division Bench order, the Supreme Court restored the appeals to the file of the Division Bench for consideration on merits. It expressly clarified that its observations were confined to the issue of locus and should not be read as any opinion on the allegations, the FIRs, or the validity of any subsequent ECIR.
To enable the appellants to seek interim protection before the High Court, the Supreme Court stayed investigation in the impugned FIRs for ten days. However, it said this temporary stay should not be treated as a final view on interim relief, leaving the Division Bench free to pass appropriate orders independently and in accordance with law.
The ruling is significant because it underscores that when a judicial order directly affects individuals by directing criminal process against them, they cannot be shut out from appellate remedies merely because they were not parties to the original writ petition.
Bottom Line:
Persons against whom Single Judge directed registration of FIR and investigation, though not parties to writ petition, have locus to challenge such order in appeal - Refusal of leave by Division Bench held erroneous - Supreme Court restored appeals and granted liberty to seek interim relief.
Statutory provision(s): Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 175 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013
Pinarayi Vijayan v. K M Shajahan, (SC) : Law Finder Doc id # 3000458
