Court Rules Internal Communications Not Final Sanction Orders; CVC Advice Validates Prosecution Sanction Under Prevention of Corruption Act
In a significant judgment dated October 8, 2026, the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, dismissed a petition challenging the prosecution sanction granted against Jay Pratap Singh Chauhan, Deputy Manager (Technical) at the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), in a bribery case investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The judgment clarifies the legal position regarding sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the role of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) in such matters.
The case arose from a complaint alleging that Brijendra Singh, Manager (Technical), NHAI Gorakhpur, demanded a bribe of Rs. 1.5 lakhs for issuing a No Objection Certificate (NOC) required for establishing a petrol pump. A trap was laid by CBI on July 3, 2024, which resulted in Singh's arrest and implicated Jay Pratap Singh Chauhan as a co-conspirator based on intercepted telephonic conversations and other evidence.
The petitioner challenged the prosecution sanction dated October 6, 2025, passed by the Member (Admin) of NHAI, and the subsequent cognizance order passed by the Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Court, Lucknow, on December 17, 2025. The challenge was primarily based on the contention that the competent authority had earlier declined sanction twice, on February 6 and February 20, 2025, and that the final sanction was granted without any fresh material or proper application of mind. The petitioner also argued that the prosecution material did not prima facie establish any demand or acceptance of bribe by him.
The Court meticulously examined the facts and relevant law, including the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Section 19), the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (Section 8(1)(g)), and the newly enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Section 528). It was observed that the alleged earlier communications declining sanction were merely internal notings within NHAI's administrative division, lacking official letterheads, seals, or external communication, and hence could not be construed as final orders refusing sanction. The only formal sanction order was that dated October 6, 2025, which was duly issued on NHAI letterhead and bore official seals and numbering.
The Court further relied on the Office Memorandum dated March 1, 2019, issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, which mandates that if a competent authority other than the President proposes not to grant sanction for prosecution, it must report the case to the CVC and take further action after considering its advice. The Court held that the NHAI competent authority was not empowered to refuse sanction unilaterally and was justified in granting sanction after considering the CVC's recommendation dated September 17, 2025.
Addressing the petitioner's argument on lack of fresh material, the Court clarified that the sanction order was passed after a full application of mind considering the complaint, verification report, pre-trap and post-trap memos, statements under Section 180 BNSS, and the overall facts and circumstances, and not merely on post-trap documents.
On the question of whether the trial court erred in taking cognizance and summoning the petitioner despite the absence of the word `paisa' (money) in the telephonic conversation transcript, the Court held that at the cognizance stage, only a prima facie case is required to be established. The content of the conversations, trap proceedings, and other material together formed sufficient prima facie evidence.
The Court also rejected the contention that the revocation of the petitioner's suspension by the NHAI administrative authorities invalidated the criminal prosecution. It highlighted the distinction between departmental proceedings and criminal trial, noting that exoneration or favorable departmental orders do not ipso facto quash criminal prosecution.
Citing several Supreme Court judgments including Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007), Vijay Rajmohan v. CBI (2023), and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012), the Court reiterated that minor irregularities or errors in sanction do not cause failure of justice and that the validity of sanction is primarily a question of procedure, not jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the Allahabad High Court found no illegality or infirmity in the prosecution sanction order or the cognizance order and dismissed the petition with a clarification that the observations made would not affect the merits of the trial.
This judgment provides clarity on the procedural aspects of sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act and underscores the mandatory role of the CVC's advice in cases involving public servants. It also reaffirms that internal departmental communications without formal orders do not amount to refusal of sanction, thereby ensuring that prosecution processes are not derailed on technical grounds.
Bottom Line:
Prevention of Corruption Act - Sanction for prosecution - Internal departmental communications/notings declining sanction do not amount to a final order refusing sanction unless issued as a formal communicated order - Competent authority was justified in considering CVC advice and granting sanction - At cognizance stage, only prima facie satisfaction is required and alleged infirmities in sanction causing no failure of justice cannot be examined for quashing proceedings under Section 528 BNSS.
Statutory provision(s):
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section 7, Section 19; Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 Section 8(1)(g); Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 528
