Court says protection under POCSO for minors is absolute; subsequent marriage, family settlement, and victim’s consent cannot erase alleged offences committed during minority
The Delhi High Court has dismissed a petition seeking quashing of an FIR and criminal proceedings in a case involving offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), holding that proceedings under the special law cannot be terminated merely because the accused later married the victim and both families entered into a settlement.
Justice Sanjeev Narula, deciding the matter in Salman Ahamad v. State NCT of Delhi and Others on November 4, 2026, ruled that the statutory protection granted to minors under the POCSO Act is absolute and cannot be overridden by consent, compromise, or subsequent marriage.
The petitioner had approached the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking quashing of FIR No. 102/2023 registered at Mehrauli police station. The FIR was initially lodged under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and the chargesheet later included Sections 363 and 376 IPC as well as Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
According to the prosecution, the victim’s mother reported on February 2, 2023, that her daughter, then said to be around 15 years old, had gone missing the previous day. The girl was traced in December 2023, and her medical examination confirmed that she was pregnant. In her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, she said she had voluntarily gone with the petitioner and had physical relations with him of her own will.
Before the High Court, the petitioner argued that the parties had since married, were living together as husband and wife, and had a child born on June 7, 2024. He relied on a Nikahnama and a memorandum of understanding, and pointed out that both the victim and her mother had filed affidavits supporting quashing of the proceedings. The victim also personally told the Court that she was happily married and did not want the case to continue.
However, the State opposed the plea, stressing that school records collected during investigation showed the victim’s date of birth as March 15, 2008, making her a minor at the relevant time. The prosecution maintained that the allegations disclosed serious offences under both the IPC and the POCSO Act, and that marriage or settlement after the incident could not nullify the prosecution.
The High Court noted that the victim’s age was central to the case. Based on school records, she was about 14 years and 10 months old when she left home and about 15 years and 9 months old when her pregnancy was medically confirmed. The Court also recorded that the petitioner did not dispute being the father of the child, and held that the material on record, including medical evidence and age documents collected during investigation, prima facie supported the allegation of penetrative sexual assault resulting in pregnancy, attracting aggravated provisions under Section 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
On the petitioner’s argument that there was a discrepancy in the victim’s age, the Court said such issues could not be conclusively decided in quashing proceedings. It held that competing evidence, including the victim’s own statement and identity documents relied upon by the defence, would have to be examined by the trial court.
Justice Narula underscored that under Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act, a child means any person below 18 years of age, and under the statutory framework, consent of a minor has no legal value. Referring to Supreme Court rulings including Independent Thought v. Union of India and Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action v. Union of India, the Court said marriage does not take away the protection that penal law gives to a child.
The High Court further held that its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS, analogous to Section 482 CrPC, are limited and cannot be used to extinguish serious statutory offences merely because the parties have settled their dispute. Citing Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan, and In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, the Court observed that POCSO offences are not private disputes and have broader societal implications.
The Court distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, relied on by the petitioner, noting that the relief there was granted under Article 142 of the Constitution in exceptional circumstances and was not intended to serve as a precedent. It clarified that such extraordinary power belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court and is not available to the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS.
While acknowledging the victim’s present wishes, the support of her mother, and the welfare of the child born from the relationship, the Court said these considerations could not alter the legal character of acts allegedly committed when the victim was a minor. It added that the petitioner was free to approach the Supreme Court for any extraordinary relief under Article 142, if so advised.
Dismissing the petition, the High Court clarified that its observations were limited to the issue of quashing and would not affect the trial. It directed that the Special Court would independently determine the victim’s age, the ingredients of the alleged offences, and all other issues on the basis of evidence.
Bottom Line:
High Court cannot quash proceedings under the POCSO Act merely based on a matrimonial settlement or compromise between the parties, as the statutory protection afforded to minors under the Act cannot be overridden by consent or subsequent marriage.
Statutory provision(s): Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Sections 2(1)(d), 3, 5(j)(ii), 6 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Sections 363, 375, 376 Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Article 142 Constitution of India
Salman Ahamad v. State NCT of Delhi, (Delhi) : Law Finder Doc id # 3102687