Court holds that arbitral quantification based on measurements and invoices cannot be cut down merely because the amount appears high or “shocks the conscience” of the court.
The Supreme Court has restored an arbitral award in favour of M/s Marino Dredgeco Limited in a long-running dispute with the Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata, holding that the Calcutta High Court exceeded its limited powers under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
A Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran set aside the High Court’s judgment, which had reduced the contractor’s awarded amount to 50% and cut interest to 6% per annum. The High Court had justified the reduction on the ground that the claim for additional work was more than 70% of the original contract value and that this “shocked the conscience” of the court.
The Supreme Court rejected that approach, observing that such subjective discomfort cannot by itself form a valid ground for interference with an arbitral award. The Court said that unless there is a substantive conflict with the basic notions of morality or justice, the “shock the conscience” standard cannot be used as a substitute for merits review.
The dispute arose out of a dredging contract for the Sagar Island pilot station project. The contractor argued that additional work became necessary because of severe siltation, adverse force majeure conditions, and inaccurate soil data supplied by the Port Trust. It was also pointed out that the Port Trust had itself issued a letter dated 19 July 2000 acknowledging the need for additional work.
The arbitral tribunal had accepted the contractor’s claim on the basis of measurements, pre- and post-work levels, and invoices. The Single Judge under Section 34 had upheld the award. However, the Division Bench in appeal under Section 37 interfered and reduced the award, despite recording that the arbitral award was neither perverse nor based on no evidence.
The Supreme Court said this was impermissible. It emphasized that Section 37 review is extremely limited and does not allow courts to reassess evidence or re-adjudicate the quantum simply because the amount appears large. The Bench noted that the additional work was of the same nature as the original contract—dredging to keep the channel and basin operational—and could not be compartmentalized into “valid” and “invalid” components.
The Court also relied on recent precedents, including Ssangyong Engineering, Somdatt Builders, Gayatri Balasamy, and Pam Developments, to reiterate that arbitral awards cannot be interfered with on vague notions of public policy, patent illegality, or shock to conscience unless the legal threshold is clearly met.
Rejecting the Port Trust’s plea for greater interference merely because it was a government entity, the Court said parties to arbitration must be treated equally, and state bodies do not get special treatment in challenging monetary awards.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the contractor’s appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and restored the arbitral award in full. The Port Trust’s appeal was disposed of as a consequence.
Statutory provision(s): Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 37